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ABSTRACT
In this article we examine the Equity Premium in the Indian context and review the related
literature. The equity premium is the returned earned by a well-diversified stock portfolio in excess
of that earned by a risk free security such as a Treasury Bill. Consistent with U.S. experience we find
that the Indian equity premium has been quite high in the post 1991 period, averaging 9.7% above
the corresponding risk free security. It is difficult to justify such a premium based on theoretical
considerations.










The equity premium is the return earned by a risky security, such as a stock, in 
excess of that earned by a risk free security, such as a Treasury Bill. It is a crucial input 
into financial decisions such as asset allocation, capital budgeting and planning for 
retirement. 
Historical data provide a wealth of evidence documenting that over long periods 
of time, stock returns have been considerably higher than returns for T-bills. As Table 1 
shows, the average annual real return (that is, the inflation-adjusted return) on the U.S. 
stock market for the past 115 years has been about 7.5 percent. In the same period, the 
real return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry 1.0 percent.  
 
Table 1. 
U.S. Returns, 1802–2004 
  Mean Real Return   
Period  Market Index 
Relatively 
Riskless 
Security  Risk Premium 
1802–2004  6.9%  2.9%  4.0% 
1889–2004  7.5  1.0  6.5 
1926–2004  8.0  0.7  7.3 
1947–2004  7.5  0.5  7.0 
 
 
The difference between these two returns, 6.5 percentage points, is the equity 
premium. This statistical difference has been even more pronounced in the post-World 
War II period. Data on U.S. stock and bond returns going back to 1802 reveal a similar, 
although somewhat smaller, premium for the past 200 years.  4 
Furthermore, this pattern of excess returns to equity holdings is not unique to 
U.S. capital markets. Table 2 documents that equity returns in other developed 
countries also exhibit this historical regularity when compared with the return to 




Returns for Selected Developed Countries 
    Mean Real Return   






United Kingdom  1947–1999  5.7%  1.1%  4.6% 
Japan  1970–1999  4.7  1.4  3.3 
Germany  1978–1997  9.8  3.2  6.6 
France  1973–1998  9.0  2.7  6.3 
Sweden  1919-2003  11.1  5.6  5.5 
Australia  1900-2000  13.3  4.6  8.7 
 
The annual return on the U.K. stock market, for example, was 5.7 percent in the 
post-WWII period, an impressive 4.6% premium over the average bond return of 1.1 
percent. Similar statistical differences have been documented for France, Germany, and 
Japan. And together, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and 
France account for more than 85 percent of capitalized global equity value. 
Table 3 details the equity premium for India for the “post liberalization” period, 
using both the BSE 100 and the Sensex index as a proxy for the return on equity. Since 5 
participation in the T-bill market was highly regulated before 2000, we report the equity 
premium relative to the Bank Deposit Rate, using the later as a proxy for the return on 





For the period prior to 1991 reliable data on dividend yields is not available. In 
Table 4, we report the equity premium using the average annual stock price index as 














India Returns, 1991-2004 
  Relatively 
Riskless 
Security  BSE 100 
Equity 
Premium 





Return %  1.28  12.6  11.3  11.0  9.7 
Standard 
Deviation %  1.73  37.2  37.7  32.6  33.2 
Table 4 
India Returns, 1984-1991 
  Relatively 
Riskless 





Return %  1.13  22.4  21.3 
Standard 
Deviation %  0.74  28.1  27.9 6 
We illustrate the dramatic investment implications of the differential rates of 
return in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 shows the enormous disparity in capital appreciation 
of $1 invested in different assets in the U.S for various time periods.
1 Table 6 displays a 
similar analysis for India 
 
Table 5. 
Real Terminal Value of $1 Invested 
  Stocks 
 
T-Bills  Ratio 
Investment Period       
1889–2004  $4092.36  $3.14  1,303.30 
1926–2004  $407.56  $1.67  244.05 




Real Terminal Value of Rs 1 Invested 
  Stocks (BSE 100) 
 
Bank Deposit  Ratio 
Investment Period       
1984–2004  Rs 19.25  Rs 1.28  15.04 
1991–2004  Rs 4.68  Rs 1.18  3.97 
 
One can gain additional insights by examining what these differential rates imply 
for the time it takes to double one’s money. Using rates in India over the 1991-2004 
period, the doubling period for investments in stocks is about 6 years compared to about 
                                                 
1The calculations in Table 5 assume that all payments to the underlying asset, such as dividend payments to stocks 
and interest payments to bonds, were reinvested and that no taxes were paid. 7 
55 years for investments in a risk free asset.  This kind of long-term perspective 
underscores the remarkable wealth-building potential of the equity premium and 
highlights why it is of central importance in portfolio allocation decisions, in making 
estimates of the cost of capital, and in the current debate about the advantages of 
investing Social Security Trust or retirement funds in the stock market. 
A Premium for Bearing Risk? 
Why has the rate of return on stocks in India and other countries been significantly 
higher than the rate of return on relatively risk free assets? An intuitive answer is that 
stocks are “riskier” than bonds and investors require a premium for bearing this 
additional risk. Indeed, the standard deviation of the returns to stocks in India (about 
30 percent a year historically) is larger than that of the returns to T-bills (about 2 
percent a year), so obviously, stocks are considerably riskier than bills.  
But are they? Figure 1 illustrates the variability in the annual real rate of return 
on the BSE 100 Index while Figure 2 shows the variability of a relatively risk free 
security over the 1991–2004 period.  8 
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To enhance and deepen our understanding of the risk-return trade-off in the 
pricing of financial assets, we make a detour into modern asset pricing theory and look 
at why different assets yield different rates of return. The deux ex machina of this 
theory is that assets are priced such that, ex-ante, the loss in marginal utility incurred 
by sacrificing current consumption and buying an asset at a certain price is equal to the 
expected gain in marginal utility contingent on the anticipated increase in consumption 
when the asset pays off in the future.  
The operative emphasis here is the incremental loss or gain in well being due to 
incremental consumption, which must be differentiated from the incremental 
consumption itself. This is because the same amount of incremental consumption may 
result in different degrees of well-being at different times. A five-course dinner after a 
heavy lunch, for example, yields considerably less satisfaction than a similar dinner 
when one is hungry! 
As a consequence, assets that pay off when times are good and consumption 
levels are high, i.e. when the incremental value of additional consumption is low, are less 
desirable than those that pay off an equivalent amount when times are bad and 
additional consumption is both desirable and more highly valued. 
Let us illustrate this principle in the context of the standard, popular paradigm, 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model postulates a linear relationship 
between an asset’s ‘beta’, a measure of systematic risk, and expected return. Thus, high 11 
beta stocks yield a high-expected rate of return. That is so because in the CAPM, good 
times and bad times are captured by the return on the market. The performance of the 
market as captured by a broad based index acts as a surrogate indicator for the relevant 
state of the economy.  A high beta security tends to pay off more when the market 
return is high, that is, when times are good and consumption is plentiful; as discussed 
earlier, such a security provides less incremental utility than a security that pays off 
when consumption is low, is less valuable to investors and consequently sells for less. 
Thus assets that pay off in states of low marginal utility will sell for a lower price than 
similar assets that pay off in states of high marginal utility. Since rates of return are 
inversely proportional to asset prices, the latter class of assets will, on average, give a 
lower rate of return than the former. 
Another perspective on asset pricing emphasizes that economic agents prefer to 
smooth patterns of consumption over time. Assets that pay off a relatively larger 
amount at times when consumption is already high, “destabilize” these patterns of 
consumption, whereas assets that pay off when consumption levels are low, “smooth” 
out consumption. Naturally, the latter are more valuable and thus require a lower rate 
of return to induce investors to hold these assets. (Insurance policies are a classic 
example of assets that smooth consumption. Individuals willingly purchase and hold 
them, in spite of their very low rates of return.) 
To return to the original question: are stocks so much more riskier than bills so 
as to justify a 7% differential in their rates of return as observed in the U.S? 12 
What came as a surprise to many economists and researchers in finance was the 
conclusion of a research paper that Edward Prescott and I wrote in 1979.  Stocks and 
bonds pay off in approximately the same states of nature or economic scenarios and 
hence, as argued earlier, they should command approximately the same rate of return. 
In fact, using standard theory to estimate risk-adjusted returns, we found that stocks in 
the U.S on average should command, at most, a 1% return premium over bills. Since, 
for as long as we had reliable data, (about a hundred years), the mean premium on 
stocks over bills was considerably and consistently higher, we realized that we had a 
puzzle on our hands. It took us six more years to convince a skeptical profession and for 
our paper “ The Equity Premium: A Puzzle” to be published. (Mehra and Prescott 
(1985)).  
For the purpose of this article, I have done a similar analysis for India using the 





Indian Economy Sample Statistics, 1991–2004 
Statistic  Value 
Risk-free rate, Rf    1.0128 
Mean return on equity, E (Re)    1.126 
Mean growth rate of consumption, E (x)    1.0227 
Standard deviation of growth rate of 
consumption, σ(x)    0.0224 
Mean equity premium, E (Re) – Rf    0.113 
 13 
I find that the theoretical equity premium should be in the range 0.02% to 0.16% 
if the coefficient of risk aversion is varied from 2 to 10. Since the observed risk premium 
in India is an order of magnitude more, we have a puzzle with respect to Indian data as 
well. 
 I want to emphasize that the equity premium puzzle is a quantitative puzzle. 
Standard theory is qualitatively consistent with our notion of  risk: stocks do, on 
average, return more than bonds in the theoretical model. The puzzle arises from the 
fact that the quantitative predictions of the theory are an order of magnitude different 
from what has been historically documented. The puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly 
because much of our economic intuition and policy directives are based on the very class 
of models that fall short so dramatically when confronted with financial data. It 
underscores the failure of paradigms central to financial and economic modeling to 
capture the characteristic that appears to make stocks comparatively so risky. Hence, 
the viability of using this class of models for any quantitative assessment—for example, 
to gauge the welfare implications of alternative stabilization policies—is thrown open to 
question. 
For this reason, over the past 20 years or so, attempts to resolve the puzzle have 
become a major research impetus in finance and economics. Several generalizations of 
key features of the Mehra–Prescott (1985) model have been proposed to reconcile 
observations with theory, including alternative assumptions about preferences, modified 
probability distributions to admit rare but disastrous events, survivorship bias, 14 
incomplete markets, and market imperfections. None have satisfactorily resolved the 
puzzle.  
Recently some researchers and analysts have argued that ex-ante equity premium 
is likely to be low. The data used to document the equity premium  (over the past 100 
years in some instances) represents as reliable an economic data set as analysts have, 
and 100 years is long series when it comes to economic data. Before the equity premium 
is dismissed, not only do researchers need to understand the observed phenomena, but 
they also need a plausible explanation as to why the future is likely to be any different 
from the past. Demographic shifts and changes in participation in equity markets will, 
of course, impact on the equity premium in India over time. For instance, greater stock 
market participation in particular by the younger generation is likely to reduce the 
equity premium. However, before these demographic effects play a role, on the basis of 
what is currently known, I make the following assertion: the equity premium in the 
future is likely to be similar to what it has been in the past and returns to investment in 
equity will continue to substantially dominate returns to investment in T-bills for 
investors with long planning horizons. 
 
Further Reading: Two introductory articles are Cochrane (1997) and Mehra 
(2003). Kocherlakota (1996) and Mehra and Prescott (2003) provide comprehensive 
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